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INTRODUCTION
This is in response to the invitation from U.S. District Court Judge
Victor Marrero and the Cardozo Law Review to offer perspectives on
Judge Marrero’s Article, The Costs of Rules, the Rule of Costs. 1
Judge Marrero’s Article is no ordinary Law Review Article. To
begin with, it is ninety pages in length, written with passion and
intensity. Its title targets practicing lawyers, but its content, upon close
examination, challenges all parts of the legal profession. The problems
involve rising costs and resulting abuses caused by expansive discovery
and expensive motion practice, supported by and embedded in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and modern-day law practice. The
problems discussed, however, are not simply those of practicing lawyers
engaged in civil justice litigation. Courts have their responsibilities, too,
since judges can make significant differences in dealing with the
problems raised, and many do, through the exercise of their case
management authority and judicial powers. In a very real sense, the
challenges presented by the civil litigation costs and abuses identified by
Judge Marrero need to be addressed by the entire legal profession.
Judge Marrero, a recent recipient of the Federal Bar Council’s
Emory Buckner Award for Outstanding Public Service, has given much
of his life to public service in a variety of roles. 2 Through the lens of a
thoughtful and able jurist, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs takes a
hard look at the civil justice system. Thankfully, Judge Marrero’s
concerns and alarms are being taken seriously by his colleagues on the
bench and by the organized bar of New York. This special issue of the
Victor Marrero, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599 (2016)
Judge Marrero served in many government positions before joining the bench of the
Southern District in 1999. Some of these roles include serving as Undersecretary of the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development; as U.S. Ambassador on the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations; as Chairman of the New York City Planning
Commission; as Commissioner and Vice Chairman of the New York State Housing Finance
Agency; as Chair of the New York State Chief Judge’s Committee to Improve the Availability of
Legal Services; and as Counsel to the Governor of New York State and Comptroller of New
York City. While in private law practice, he co-founded the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
Education Fund and served on boards and committees of the New York Public Library, the
State University of New York, and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. See
Marrero, Victor, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/marrero-victor
[https://perma.cc/55JK-AX7W] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018); Hon. Victor Marrero, PRACTISING L.
INST., https://www.pli.edu/Content/Faculty/Hon_Victor_Marrero/_/N-4oZ1z136ui?ID=
PE464456 [https://perma.cc/Q562-X8FR] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
1
2
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Cardozo Law Review, as well as the 2016 Issue where the Article
appeared, speaks well of current law students wanting to see the
challenges addressed. Thomas Jefferson once noted, “I hold it that a
little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the
political world as storms in the physical. . . . It is a med[icine] necessary
for the sound health of government.”3 Judge Marrero, who a long time
ago stirred such a revolution by calling for mandatory pro bono lawyers
in New York State, may well have ignited another such revolution. The
recommendations of that earlier Committee stirred the legal profession
and law schools to lift their commitment to helping those in need of
legal services who were unable to afford counsel. 4
Upon receiving Judge Marrero’s request, I asked how I qualified to
comment on his study’s treatment of pleadings, discovery, and motions
in modern day law practice and the remedies he proposed. My initial
hesitation was due to the fact that, for the last thirty-six years, I have
been in academia as a law school dean and then a professor in the
classroom, preceded a long time ago by the active practice of law as an
associate and partner in a New York firm. Throughout all these years,
however, I have been active in the work of the organized bar and have
responded to requests to serve as a neutral in the resolution of conflicts
in alternative dispute resolution (ADR). I have formed a view from my
total life experiences that judges can make a major difference in
addressing the problems described by Judge Marrero and that the world
of ADR, especially that of mediation, offers models and remedies
worthy of consideration.
I set forth in Part I a summary of Judge Marrero’s Article. Part II
contains commentaries and responses by me concerning individual
practices of judges under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
comments of others I surveyed, possible ADR remedies that are
available, and the potential that inheres in collaborations by courts with
the organized bar and the many law schools with experienced teachers,
scholars, and educated and trained students in the field of ADR. I
conclude with gratitude to Judge Marrero for sharing his insights on
modern day civil justice and inspiring me and others to reflect on the
civil justice system.

3 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30, 1787), https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-11-02-0095 [https://perma.cc/VB7N-4YA4].
4 VICTOR MARRERO, COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES:
FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Apr. 1990), reprinted in 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 755, 756 (1991).
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I. OVERVIEW: THE COST OF RULES, THE RULE OF COSTS
A.

Introduction

Judge Marrero begins his Article with reference to 1938, when the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Federal Rules) became effective.
He points to Rule 1 as the mantra for a newly organized federal judicial
system intended to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding” 5 and juxtaposes those
aims with the reality of the previous unworkable system. He notes that
the Federal Rules were intended to promote efficiency through the
creation of a more fulsome factual record that would focus pretrial work
on the disputed areas, make the strengths and weaknesses of each case
more evident to both parties, and avoid certain evidentiary disputes.
The Federal Rules were also intended to limit unfair ambushes and
promote general cooperation. 6
Judge Marrero posits that the original intent of the Federal Rules is
not being realized in modern practice. He cites to surveys in which
practicing attorneys come out against the expansive rules of discovery as
too costly, 7 and he identifies attorneys’ abuse of these rules as a major
reason for the cost. 8 He further notes that these costs are not limited to
the parties in individual disputes. The excessive discovery and motion
practice “exacts a high economic and social price which must be borne
by everyone who relies on the justice system to protect and promote
vital interests as well as individual and collective values.” 9
Having first identified the problem of costs, Judge Marrero then
seeks to identify causes other than the discovery rules. The issues
identified include the Federal Rules themselves, the courts, and the new
data-gathering practices that have significantly increased the amount of
information available. But, the one issue that Judge Marrero identifies as
the root of the problem is the “professional styles and actions of lawyers
themselves.” 10
B.

The Legal Market and Law Firm Culture: Why Vexatious
Litigation Exists

Judge Marrero goes into detail about how the changes that
occurred in the size and structure of law firms in the 1960s and 1970s
5
6
7
8
9
10

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
Marrero, supra note 1, at 1602.
Id. at 1603.
Id. at 1606.
Id. at 1606–07.
Id. at 1609.
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created a need to emphasize litigation as the primary fee generator at
large law firms. 11 He attributes this shift from corporate work to
litigation to the creation of larger, more sophisticated in-house teams
that were able to accomplish many tasks traditionally left to law firms.
The growth of in-house counsel resulted in a loss of some corporate
work, and the remaining work tended to be discrete or highly
specialized by nature. As projects became more interchangeable, law
firms experienced increased scrutiny from current clients and increased
competition for new business among law firms. This increased pressure
crafted a law firm culture that emphasizes extreme competitiveness. 12
The Article then turns to the increased volume of litigation that has
served firms’ bottom lines even with the loss of a substantial amount of
corporate work to in-house teams. It emphasizes, however, “litigation
abuse may function as a boon to the bottom line, a financial engine
working to sustain a growing share of the legal profession’s
profitability.” 13
After noting the potential of law firms to increase their billings
through over-litigating, Judge Marrero begins a discussion of how the
prices at the top of the market and the “longer delays of court
proceedings involving wealthy litigants can hinder justice at the bottom
of the economic scale.” 14 He notes that the complexity of disputes
between wealthy parties that command the attention of the most adept
lawyers unduly congest the courts at the expense of those who have
cases that are too “financially unappealing” to attract attorneys. 15 As
such, the courts have been faced with a greater number of pro se
litigants, which increase the burden on public resources of the courts as
it takes more time to construe complaints and arguments that have been
drafted by non-lawyers. 16
The Article concludes Part I by stating that it is evident “abusive
lawyering remains pervasive under the existing rules” and “it is not the
procedural rules themselves that account for the litigation extremes and
inefficiencies they encounter in court proceedings.” 17 Judge Marrero
finds it more likely that the “interaction of economic and professional
forces, combined with lawyers’ own practice styles and the methods they

See generally id. at 1610–23.
Id. at 1616–18.
13 Id. at 1624.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1624–25.
17 Id. at 1632. In 1983, in an attempt to curtail vexatious litigation, Rule 11 was introduced.
Id. at 1630–31. However, this was seen as a double-edged sword where filings of Rule 11
sanctions became commonplace and were themselves abusive. Id. at 1631. Citing to cases where
judges evaluate excessive costs, Judge Marrero notes that when opposing counsel objects to
prevailing parties’ application for fee reimbursement, judges reduce the fee award by 33.5% on
average. Id. at 1631 n.89.
11
12
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employ in applying the rules, . . . better explain the excess.” 18 Judge
Marrero points to “inherent inefficiencies, as well as disincentives for
improvement, [which] are fundamentally embedded in the justice
system,” as the unnamed culprit to excessive fees and litigation. 19
C.

How and Where Over-Litigation Exists: Practice Style and
Motion Practice

After outlining why the structure of the legal market has generated
vexatious litigation tactics in Part I, the second part of Judge Marrero’s
Article discusses how two distinct forces—lawyers’ personalities and
litigation strategies—drive litigation abuse. The Article also outlines
proposed next steps or solutions to alleviate the stated problems.
The Article details litigation styles that perpetuate waste through
hasty and overblown action, and notes that over-litigation more
generally is caused by lawyers who “ignore or downplay a vital facet of
their role in the legal system: the public dimension.” 20 Lawyers’
abdication of their public duties, Judge Marrero suggests, taxes society
by causing “inconvenience to witnesses and third parties; disruption of
business operations and personal affairs;” 21 and the imposition on
courts of “ancillary disputes that counsel should not have escalated to
the judge in the first place.” 22 Ultimately, Judge Marrero identifies the
largest offender in this cycle of waste as the “deep-rooted culture of
widespread, routine inefficiencies and condoned extremes.” 23
Judge Marrero offers a mini-antidote by suggesting a culture shift
away from lawyers’ focus on personal gain and to a more client- and
society-focused view of the profession. He adds that stronger economic
sanctions for “excess and abuse” and more “disciplinary actions” should
be deployed to help with this culture shift. 24 Ultimately, he posits that
the “nuclear option” should also be available to deploy against abuse:
“shifting the obligation to pay counsel’s fees and costs to a client or
attorney that a court formally finds has engaged in serious abuse of the
rules through frivolous, dilatory, or disproportionately extreme
litigation tactics.” 25
Additionally, because hourly rates incentivize spending more time
on cases, he comments, lawyers are likely to ignore, rather than address,
problems caused by over-litigation. To combat willful blindness, Judge
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Id. at 1632.
Id.
Id. at 1641.
Id.
Id. at 1642.
Id. at 1644.
Id. at 1645.
Id.
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Marrero suggests conducting empirical studies to identify particularly
cost-intensive areas of litigation that may be dispensed with altogether. 26
1.

Excessive and Deficient Pleadings

Judge Marrero begins his assessment of over-litigation with the
problem of excessive and deficient pleadings. While the Federal Rules
often allow for the claims made, he states, they are often unnecessary or
misdirected. He highlights the problem of fishing expeditions in
complaints that target harms and wrongdoers with little discretion or
regard for merit. 27 These complaints are frequently met with hiding or
withholding of information instead of a good-faith production of
relevant information. The dragnet complaint begets the massive
collateral expense of jurisdictional fights, especially where many
different entities are involved. Judge Marrero suggests avoiding these
delays by including only the most well-founded claims in the pleadings
and allowing other claims to be preserved by stipulated agreements or
by withdrawal without prejudice. 28
To further curtail excessive and deficient pleadings, Judge Marrero
advocates for a rule that would discourage surprise court filings and
reduce the likelihood of nonsensical or inadequate pleadings. He
proposes that plaintiffs verify that they have contacted defendants in an
effort to discuss the dispute before filing the complaint.
[S]uch disclosure should describe: any notice they gave about the
substance of their claims before resorting to litigation; the
defendants’ response; and whether there is any action the defendants
should take or information or documents they should produce prior
to the parties’ appearance in court at the initial conference, that
might induce the plaintiffs to resolve all or part of the lawsuit. 29

In this regime, Judge Marrero notes that “defendants should state
whether there is any action plaintiffs should take or information or
documents they should produce, that might persuade the defendants to
drop all or parts of their responses or counterclaims.” 30 The resulting
complaint would either reach the court with certain issues resolved or
highlight certain issues for resolution.

26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 1674.
Id. at 1648.
Id. at 1651.
Id. at 1675–76.
Id.
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Motions to Dismiss

Judge Marrero argues that defendants often respond to any
complaint with a motion to dismiss out of habit. In his view,
“defendants should . . . admit allegations in a complaint and furnish
particulars upon request about uncontroversial and undisputable
facts . . . [taking] such issues out of contention rather than prolong[ing]
the conflict.” 31 He acknowledges that “[r]egrettably, the most
straightforward, speedy, and economical resolution of a dispute is not
always what many litigants and counsel—plaintiffs’ and defendants’—
perceive as advancing their interests.” 32 And that, as a result, defendants’
answers tend to be formalistic, “volunteering as little as possible.” 33
Judge Marrero states the model defendant would “disclose facts that in
the exercise of candor and good faith they should readily admit.” 34 He
laments that the Federal Rules allow defendants to operate without
requiring a discussion with the plaintiffs and with no prior
communication with the court. 35
Judge Marrero states that the motion to dismiss has a mixed rate of
success, achieving complete victory in 25% to 30% of cases. 36 He also
notes that often these dismissals are not with prejudice and as such give
life to new complaints, or worse, appeals. The Article also notes that
procedural tidiness, such as motions to strike duplicative actions or
specific allegations, contribute to delay while producing very little in the
way of justice. 37
Judge Marrero suggests instituting procedurally required plaintiff–
defendant interaction to curtail the problems of blanket motions to
dismiss. Before filing a motion to dismiss, the defendant should “alert
plaintiffs about the specific defects in the pleadings—whether
procedural, jurisdictional, or substantive—that constitute the grounds”
upon which the defendant will object. 38 This would allow plaintiffs the
chance to amend the complaint before the judge is required to decide
the motion submitted by the defendant. 39
3.

Discovery

The next area of practice addressed is discovery. Judge Marrero
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 1652.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1653.
Id.
Id. at 1653–56.
Id. at 1677–78.
Id.
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notes that lawyers struggle with two main issues: first, how much
discovery is actually necessary for the case, and second, what amount of
resources are justified for the desired end. 40 Consuming anywhere from
50% to 90% of the litigation cost, discovery is the area in which overlitigation can be most significantly reduced. 41 This is especially the case
where a defendant’s potential liability is massive or unbound.
The Article notes that discovery can be used as a tool of abuse to
impose large costs on opponents in order to compel settlement, to hold
hearings where parties air animosity toward each other, and to overprepare as a means of hitting billable hours. 42 The specific discovery
tools employed in over-litigation are “demands for production of
documents, depositions, written interrogatories, and admission of
facts.” 43 The efforts to create a fulsome record for trial, he argues, are
almost always for show, however, as only 2% of these disputes ever
utilize the depositions taken and documents produced for trial. 44
In this area, Judge Marrero advocates for the judge to take both a
more active and more informal role in management. In this informal
role, the judge could advise the parties as to his view of the request and
allow the parties to modify accordingly. Should parties continue on
what the judge deems an inappropriate or wasteful course, the judge
could employ sanction-type remedies available under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 45
4.

Summary Judgment

At the end of discovery, another potentially wasteful practice
emerges: motions for summary judgment. The Article notes that many
summary judgment motions are filed prematurely or are entirely
frivolous. These create needless delays in resolution and drain court
resources. According to a study by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC),
these motions increase the cost of litigation from 22% to 24% 46 and
increase the length of litigation by anywhere from nine to fifteen
months. 47 Despite the time and mixed success of these motions, they are
almost always on the litigation schedule, suggesting that most lawyers
believe that there will be no genuine issues of material fact in their
proceedings. 48 The time and expense of these motions, Judge Marrero
Id. at 1656–59.
Id. at 1656.
42 Id. at 1658.
43 Id. at 1659.
44 Id. at 1660.
45 Id. at 1630 (noting that “judges may require practitioners who multiply judicial
proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously to personally pay the excess attorneys’ fees and costs
that adversaries incur by reason of such misconduct”).
46 Id. at 1665.
47 Id.
48 Id.
40
41
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notes, is magnified by the fact that judges frequently do not address
them at all, or deny them in whole or in part—making a substantial
amount of time and work relatively useless. 49
Judge Marrero, viewing unfounded or premature motions for
summary judgment as one of the largest problems facing our courts’
efficient administration of justice today, proposes a multi-tiered
solution to the issue. He maintains that the litigants should not have the
ability to file as a matter of right. Instead, he suggests that the parties
should have to schedule a conference with the court to discuss the basis
for the motion. Before granting leave for the conference, the court
should request pre-conference letters, which set forth the legal and
factual support for the prospective motion. 50
If there are genuine issues, the judge should ask the parties to
“proceed directly to a trial on an expedited schedule . . . [where] after
the presentation of the plaintiff’s direct case, the court . . . can apply
what amounts to a trial equivalent of summary judgment
procedure . . . under Federal Rule 50.” 51 In addition, judicial action
could be utilized to discourage baseless summary judgment practice in
two other ways. First, “[t]he court could deny a party’s request to
schedule a pre-motion conference,” signaling that the judge sees the
motion as inappropriate for this stage of litigation. 52 Second, if a motion
already has been filed and “presents novel, complicated questions, the
judge could postpone ruling on all or parts of it and proceed to trial—
thereby effectively denying the motion without prejudice.” 53
5.

Disproportionate Litigation

Judge Marrero briefly concludes that where the damages listed in
the complaint are modest compared to the cost of the action for both
parties, the judge should refer the case to settlement with mediation
professionals or a magistrate judge. 54
D.

Fee Shifting

The final Section of the Article suggests a move toward the English
model of shifting the prevailing party’s costs to the losing party. While
the idea may not be novel, new problems have arisen in areas such as
discovery that fee shifting might be able to more effectively address.
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 1667.
Id. at 1678–79.
Id.
Id. at 1679.
Id. at 1679–80.
Id. at 1682.
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Judge Marrero suggests that over-litigation now “derives not so much
from deliberate misconduct by practitioners—practices that are already
unlawful—but from less visible though more extensive and pivotal
forces: counsel’s subterranean actions that governing rules do not
explicitly proscribe.” 55 He notes,
In the modern age of digital communication, electronically stored
information, commercial globalization, and Big Law, the problem as
it really exists exceeds by many orders of magnitude the concerns
over the types and incidence of offensive conduct that underlie the
attorney fee shifting regimes now in place and that initially prompted
their adoption. 56

The amount of data sought in discovery and the increasing billable hour
quotas from Big Law have driven up the cost of litigation substantially,
with the Federal Rules permitting most actions, and the public should
no longer have to shoulder the burden of increasing court gridlock and
unaffordable justice.
Judge Marrero finally posits that the “time has come for American
legislatures and courts to accord even broader recognition to the English
rule. At minimum . . . in connection with attorneys’ fees generated by
the losers in connection with discovery disputes, as well as by motions
that the presiding judge finds were needlessly, prematurely, or
improvidently filed.” 57
II. COMMENTARIES AND RESPONSES
A.

Individual Judicial Practices

The Federal Rules contain within them provisions that can greatly
alleviate the problems identified by Judge Marrero. Judges Preska,
Buchwald, and Koeltl, for example, deal with pre-motion requirements
by incorporating Local Civil Rule 37.2 into their individual rules. 58 This
rule requires counsel to request an informal conference with the court
before making a discovery motion. 59 The court must rule on the motion
Id. at 1686.
Id.
57 Id. at 1691.
58 See Hon. Loretta A. Preska, Individual Practices of Judge Loretta A. Preska, S.D.N.Y.
(May 1, 2017), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=judge_info&id=1398
[https://perma.cc/8437-52C2]; Hon. Naomi Reice Buchwald, Individual Practices of Naomi
Reice Buchwald, S.D.N.Y. (May 2017), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php
?db=judge_info&id=1406 [https://perma.cc/83TL-VL66]; Hon. John G. Koeltl, Individual
Practices of Judge John G. Koeltl, S.D.N.Y. (Mar. 2018), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/
show.php?db=judge_info&id=1517 [https://perma.cc/FE9S-2MDD].
59 BD. OF JUDGES OF THE E.D.N.Y. & THE S.D.N.Y., LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTRICTS OF NEW YORK 40 (2018), http://
55
56
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or find that the dispute cannot be resolved at the conference before
counsel may proceed with the formal motion. On non-discovery
matters, Judges Preska and Buchwald both require pre-motion
conferences in civil cases, with certain exceptions. 60 Judge Koeltl only
requires such conferences “before making a motion to dismiss, motion
to amend or a motion for summary judgment.” 61 Judges Preska and
Buchwald require the moving party to submit a three-page letter that
includes “the basis for the anticipated motion.” 62 The non-moving party
has three days to send a three-page response. Judge Preska allows the
moving party to submit a reply that is no longer than two pages within
the next day. 63 On initial pretrial conferences, Judge Koeltl makes it
explicit that “[t]he parties are expected to confer with each other
pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before the
initial conference with the Court. The parties are expected to provide a
Rule 26(f) report to the Court before the initial conference.” 64 What is
expected to occur at the conference is excerpted from Rule 26(f) in part
below:
In conferring, the parties must consider the nature and basis of their
claims and defenses and the possibilities for promptly settling or
resolving the case . . . . The attorneys of record and all unrepresented
parties that have appeared in the case are jointly responsible for
arranging the conference, for attempting in good faith to agree on the
proposed discovery plan, and for submitting to the court within 14
days after the conference a written report outlining the plan. The
court may order the parties or attorneys to attend the conference in
person. 65

These rules resemble practices that I have experienced in the field of
arbitration, both as an advocate and neutral, throughout my career as a
lawyer. They have been effective and efficient in moving matters along.
I am reminded of the commercial and civil matters in which I have
been privileged to serve as an arbitrator, sometimes alone or as a
member of a panel of three, and at times as a panel chair. In these
matters, pursuant to ADR provider rules, counsel, and at times a client
representative, appear at the pre-hearing conference where decisions are
made by the arbitrator concerning documents, discovery requests,
interrogatories, stipulations, motions, and other pre-hearing subjects
(e.g., expert reports, briefs and memoranda, and the hearing schedule),
to facilitate the arbitrable process with the goal of the arbitrator(s)
www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X7R-2WBM] (Rule 37.2).
60 Preska, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(A)); Buchwald, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(B)).
61 Koeltl, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(B)).
62 Preska, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(A)); Buchwald, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(B)).
63 Preska, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(A)).
64 Koeltl, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(A)).
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2).
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issuing a pre-hearing order, thus setting the framework for the
arbitration. Motions are often discouraged at an early stage and, when
and if made, if dispositive in nature, they are not infrequently taken
under consideration until the end of the hearing. Document and
discovery issues are relegated to the parties in the first instance to
attempt resolution within a certain time period, with a process of
resolution if differences remain after counsel confer with each other. At
times, in my experience, counsel have been encouraged to consider
settlement or mediation, a practice that now has become a routine part
of the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) widely used and
modeled Commercial Arbitration Rules, thereby removing the
psychological fear of appearing weak by raising it unilaterally. 66
I have found, both as an advocate and neutral, ADR processes to be
efficient in the handling of the most difficult and complex of matters.
ADR-trained neutrals, working under the rules and practices of ADR
institutions, have made a significant contribution to the justice system
of the country. 67 Indeed, many of these neutrals are former judges and
litigators now committed to an ADR practice.
1.

Initial Discovery Protocols

At the request of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the FJC
prepared the 2018 document Initial Discovery Protocols for the handling
of Fair Labor Standards Act cases (not pleaded as collective actions),
which offers a very useful template for civil justice cases. The FJC was
inspired by protocols developed for employment cases that, upon
implementation, led to less motion activity and a greater likelihood of

66

R-9. Mediation:

In all cases where a claim or counterclaim exceeds $75,000, upon the AAA’s
administration of the arbitration or at any time while the arbitration is pending, the
parties shall mediate their dispute pursuant to the applicable provisions of the AAA’s
Commercial Mediation Procedures, or as otherwise agreed by the parties. Absent an
agreement of the parties to the contrary, the mediation shall take place concurrently
with the arbitration and shall not serve to delay the arbitration proceedings.
However, any party to an arbitration may unilaterally opt out of this rule upon
notification to the AAA and the other parties to the arbitration. The parties shall
confirm the completion of any mediation or any decision to opt out of this rule to the
AAA. Unless agreed to by all parties and the mediator, the mediator shall not be
appointed as an arbitrator to the case.
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 14
(2013, amended 2016), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DZV5-P4T3].
67 See Commercial Arbitration Training for Arbitrators and Counsel, N.Y. STATE B. ASS’N 3,
http://www.defenseassociationofnewyork.org/resources/Documents/NYSBA%20Commercial
%20Arbitration%20Training%20Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYC3-GLMT] (last visited
Sept. 11, 2018).
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settlement. 68 The intent of the Initial Discovery Protocols was “to
encourage the parties and their counsel to exchange information and
documents early in the case, help frame the issues to be resolved, and
plan for more efficient and targeted discovery.” 69 Lawyers and judges
participated in the development of the protocols. 70 The FJC report states
that
[the] discovery is provided automatically by both sides within 30
days of the defendant’s responsive pleading or motion. While the
parties’ subsequent right to discovery . . . is not affected, the amount
and type of information initially exchanged ought to focus the
disputed issues, streamline the discovery process, and minimize
opportunities for gamesmanship. 71

The FJC’s 2016 report noted “that judges have applied the Employment
Protocols ‘more widely than one would expect given the parameters in
the pilot materials . . . .’” 72 The protocols give evidence of the ability of
the judiciary and bar, working together, to effectively address injustices
in the civil justice system. The accompanying Essay in this special issue
of the Cardozo Law Review by John Kiernan, Esq. offers many
constructive ideas as to general methods of improving efficiency, with
courts playing a major role in spurring institutional cultural change. He
identifies four main areas as ripe mechanisms for change by advocates
and clients, and five in which courts can increase judicial efficiency and
stem over-litigation. 73
2.

My Limited Survey

Beyond perspectives offered in this special issue of the Cardozo
Law Review, a broad survey of the bar of New York is likely to yield
other ideas as to improving the administration of justice. My own very
limited survey of a few colleagues at the bar produced these comments:
68 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., INITIAL DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS FOR FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
CASES NOT PLEADED AS COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 1 (2018), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/
materials/12/Initial_Discovery_Protocols_FLSA_Jan_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XK9NG4KN].
69 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
70 Id. at 2–3.
71 Id. at 2.
72 Id.
73 See generally John S. Kiernan, Reducing the Cost and Increasing the Efficiency of Resolving
Commercial Disputes, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 187 (2018). Among the points he made that caught
my attention are engagement by advocates and judges in seeking creative ways to resolve
portions of a dispute early and to streamline discovery and other litigation processes; enlisting
courts in preventing conduct by opposing counsel that will impose undue burden or delay;
enforcing concepts of proportionality for the entire dispute, not just discovery, and thereby
managing adaptation of the scale of permitted processes before a decision to the dispute’s scale;
and effectively employing the power to urge parties to mediate or negotiate when settlement
seems like a potentially promising route. Id. at 190–91.
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(i) The 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules, with a particular
emphasis on proportionality, show promise in reining in some
of the abuses cited in the Article by Judge Marrero. Many costs
of discovery are attributed to reviewing data for privilege and
work product purposes in order to avoid waiver. If a court
enters an order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502, this will
eliminate many of those costs by providing that disclosure in
discovery is not a waiver either in the instant proceeding or any
other. 74
(ii) A colleague experienced in the handling of large cases noted that,
since the Sedona Conference 75 and as a result of discovery rule
changes, there has been a far more cooperative discourse
occurring in the discovery process than was the case ten years
ago. He adds that innovations like predictive coding, with its
reliance on party cooperation, are taking hold and will
substantially limit the costs of searching electronic data for
information. It is not unreasonable to think that discovery
abuse, as described in Judge Marrero’s Article, may be going
through a passing phase because of technological advances that
will allow production to be made with an algorithm and a push
of a button.
(iii) As to motions to dismiss, court cases, including from the United
States Supreme Court, have invited the best of lawyers to test an
adversary’s complaint at the 12(b)(6) 76 stage, leading to an
increase in such motions. 77
(iv) As to summary judgment, the Supreme Court’s Trilogy78 in the
1980s signaled to trial courts, according to a colleague, that they
74 Rule 502 establishes a presumption against subject matter waiver, resolves the issue of
inadvertent disclosure, provides for confidentiality orders, and supports party agreements,
among other issues. See Federal Rule of Evidence 502 (Introduction and Overview), FED.
EVIDENCE REV., http://federalevidence.com/Resources502 [https://perma.cc/2JEZ-7TNF] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2018).
75 See generally THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COOPERATION
PROCLAMATION
(2008),
http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/Opening_Grossman_
Maura.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EXP-CS3E].
76 Rule 12:

Defenses and Objections: when and How Presented; Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings; Consolidating Motions; Waiving Defenses; Pretrial Hearing . . .
(b) How to Present Defenses. Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must
be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the
following defenses by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted[.]
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
77 See Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2273 (2012); see also Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
78 The Trilogy is discussed in more detail in footnote one of the following report, excerpted
here:
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should be scrutinizing such motions more closely and granting
them more freely. The colleague, however, adds that the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York’s
requirement of Rule 56.1 statements 79 creates an enormous cost
for the parties.
(v) Suggestions for meeting and conferring hold promise and should
be encouraged. Thomas Moore, an eminent trial lawyer, recently
opined that if counsel had more opportunity to speak with each
other before making motions, the chances are enhanced that a
lot of issues traditionally brought to court could be eliminated
or truncated. Encouraging and requiring client presence in
certain parts of the pretrial process may allow clients to learn
more about what motions are frivolous and as such prevent
lawyers from pursuing them. More client involvement might
also help contain costs through a fuller understanding of
effective advocacy.
(vi) If a defendant is required to provide an advance critique on the
plaintiff’s complaint, as suggested by Judge Marrero,80 a
colleague noted that in order not to advantage unfairly the

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (clarifying the burden placed on the
party moving for summary judgment); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986) (holding that a motion for summary judgment must be measured against the
standard of proof at trial, and making the standard of proof for summary judgment
the equivalent of the standard for a directed verdict); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (holding that a plaintiff with an inherently
implausible claim must support it with more persuasive evidence than would
otherwise be necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment). A thorough
consideration of federal summary judgment practice is found in EDWARD BRUNET &
MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE (3d ed.
2006).
JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TRENDS IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE: 1975–2000
2 n.1 (2007), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/TrSJPR07.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8MCA-UWTL].
79 Local Civil Rule 56.1, titled “Statements of Material Facts on Motion for Summary
Judgment,” requires:
(a) Upon any motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, there shall be annexed to the notice of motion a separate,
short and concise statement, in numbered paragraphs, of the material facts as to
which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. Failure to
submit such a statement may constitute grounds for denial of the motion.
(b) The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a
correspondingly numbered paragraph responding to each numbered paragraph in
the statement of the moving party, and if necessary, additional paragraphs containing
a separate, short and concise statement of additional material facts as to which it is
contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.
BD. OF JUDGES OF THE E.D.N.Y. & THE S.D.N.Y., LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTRICTS OF NEW YORK, supra note 59, at 50 (Rule
56.1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
80 See Marrero, supra note 1, at 1677.
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plaintiff, the critique should be made without prejudice to later
arguments by the defendant after the complaint is actually filed.
(vii) Judge Marrero suggests that, where the actual amount in
controversy is grossly disproportionate to the costs, the judge
should promptly refer the matter to settlement. 81 While such an
option might work in certain types of cases, there is concern
about closing the door of the court to plaintiffs who appear pro
se, or by pro bono counsel, with small monetary claims that for
these parties represent a matter of “life and death” in terms of
human needs. 82 Some colleagues point out that abusive
consumer practices have been identified and eradicated because
of small claims.
(viii) As to Judge Marrero’s Article’s suggestion of a broader use by the
courts of the English rule that the loser pays the winner’s
attorney fees, 83 this could have a negative effect on plaintiffs who
are not wealthy, closing the door to many plaintiffs. Moreover,
contingent fee lawyers would need to factor it in to their risk
analysis, with the result that they might encounter a case they
would want to take but decline to do so because of the risk of
paying the defendant’s fees, which when added to everything
else, outweighs the benefit. A colleague, familiar with
international practice, is of the view that the effects of such
shifting are often exaggerated in deterring litigation, as fees are
usually limited to what are reasonable, set by a bar association,
or limited to court costs only in some foreign jurisdictions. 84
(ix) In a recent conversation with the former federal judge, Barbara
Jones, she said that she used effectively, as did other colleagues,
practices such as those employed by Judges Preska, Buchwald,
and Koeltl in their individual court rules. She added that it was
helpful at times to call lawyers into chambers to talk to them
about settlements and mediation because “lawyers cannot evade
each other at conferences in front of a judge.” She also
mentioned the opportunity present at such a conference to
discourage motions that essentially were “silly.” In a much
81
82

Id. at 1682.
The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution provides:

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rule
of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also infra Conclusion.
83 Marrero, supra note 1, at 1684–90.
84 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 851 (2016). Delaware’s Supreme Court upheld a fee shifting bylaw for reasons of
sound public policy, but the legislature subsequently banned the change due to the influences of
the state bar, according to Bainbridge. Id. at 2, 19.
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earlier conversation I had with the late Judge Milton Pollack, he
shared with me his view of the importance of a judge setting an
early trial date while providing the parties with a timeline for
document exchanges, discovery, and if necessary, motions. His
reputation for helping parties achieve settlements was
outstanding. When inquiring of former federal judge Kevin
Duffy of his strong reputation for achieving settlements, he
mentioned a time period when he had an unusually large
workload as a result of the illness of another federal judge and
sent a number of those cases to Judge Pollack for handling. In
other words, he said, he inherited Judge Pollack’s reputation!
B.

An Overview

In the last three decades of the twentieth century, as criticisms
escalated over the costs of civil litigation and the client–warrior
adversarial approach to justice resolutions, the dawn of a new field was
emerging as a possible remedy called alternative dispute resolution.
While new to civil litigation, it was not new to lawyers like me who
practiced in the field of labor law. As I pursued my career in the early
1960s in civil litigation, and the whirlwind of motion practice in the
lower courts of New York City, I became involved with firm clients,
both labor and management, where major industries could be shut
down. I was struck by the different ways disputes were handled. My first
civil justice litigation experience involved assisting a firm partner in
drafting a motion to separately state and number the causes of action
present in a ninety-page complaint. I worked night and day researching
that motion’s history and the available precedents, concluding that six
causes of action were present, as the partner believed at the very
beginning of the project. We spent many hours discussing the
complaint and drafting the motion papers. I am sure the client was
billed for this time. We lost the motion and in time the case was settled.
Had there been a meet and confer approach before making a motion, we
may well have never made that motion after a discussion by counsel
with the judge.
Concurrently, I found myself involved in grievances and collective
bargaining negotiations for employers and a printing union. As to
grievances, multi-step resolution processes were prescribed by the
collective bargaining agreements, and many such grievances were
disposed of at the first stage through amicable resolution by the parties
themselves; some were resolved at the second stage with the help of
counsel; and fewer went to the final stage of arbitration. At every point
we were forced to talk to each other and doing so made all the difference
in the world. Our arbitrators were experienced and effective in assuring
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a fair and timely hearing and conclusion to each matter. They were
trained and served under ethical standards and good practice guidelines,
not unlike the citizens of an ancient civilization who took an oath of
office before undertaking service as an arbitrator. 85 When our collective
bargaining agreements ended and new ones had to be negotiated,
federal, state, and sometimes private mediators were available for when
impasses occurred. Sometimes the mediation effort was unsuccessful,
and a work stoppage or strike occurred. However, we knew we had to
“live” with each other and we worked bilaterally to solve such
differences—and we did. The earnings from this practice area paled in
financial significance to the revenue from civil justice litigation, but the
firm was proud to have a labor and employment practice area to offer its
general clients.
The applicability of the labor management dispute resolution
structure led the late Frank E.A. Sander to opine in 1976 that the civil
justice system would benefit enormously from offering parties in
dispute other options for securing a fair, inexpensive, and timely
resolution of their disputes, 86 to which I now turn.
C.

ADR as a Remedy and Solution

The field of ADR owes a large part of its ascendancy to the courts
themselves and to the groundbreaking Pound Conference in 1976, the
event that led to the birth of modern dispute resolution, 87 and the
thought-provoking speech of Professor Frank Sander. He advocated for
the creation of a “multi-door courthouse” where a court official would
examine the nature of each new dispute during intake and decide on the
optimal dispute resolution process. 88 He argued, in a published 1990
debate, that “our mission is to help clients find the best way to handle
their disputes,” asking “why shouldn’t it be part of our explicit
professional obligation to canvass those options with clients? How
85

The oath of the citizens of Delphi provided:

Every question in the judgement relating to the moneys and boundaries of Apollo I
will decide as is true to the best of my belief, nor will I in any wise give false
judgments for the sake of favour or friendship or enmity; and the sentence passed in
accordance with the judgment I will enforce to the best of my power with all possible
speed, and I will make just restoration to the god.
MARCUS NIEBUHR TOD, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AMONGST THE GREEKS 116 (1913).
86 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address at the National Conference
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7–9, 1976), in
70 F.R.D. 79, 111–34 (1976).
87 Id.
88 In Memoriam: Frank E.A. Sander ’52, a Pioneer in the Field of Alternative Dispute
Resolution (1927–2018), HARV. L. TODAY (Feb. 27, 2018), https://today.law.harvard.edu/
memoriam-frank-e-sander-52-pioneer-field-alternative-dispute-resolution-1927-2018 [https://
perma.cc/89ZH-XRXM].
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would we feel about a doctor who suggested surgery without exploring
other possible choices?” 89
Also empowering of the ADR option was the expansive application
of the Federal Arbitration Act 90 and the passage of federal statutes
calling for the federal courts to develop cost and delay reduction plans
including ADR. 91 Even before some of these statutes, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit embraced the notion of an
appellate court promoting settlements and it added staff to assist in that
effort. 92 Law schools followed suit, adding courses to educate students
on ADR methods from negotiation to mediation to arbitration. In the
1990s, with a vision of a broader system of civil justice resolutions, bar
associations added sections and committees to educate and train
practicing lawyers. ADR provider programs and organizations grew to
assist in these developments, associating as they did so with bar
associations and law schools.
The burden and costs of civil justice litigation in New York, as
described by Judge Marrero, strongly suggest to me that there should be
a greater use of ADR processes offered to parties as options. As noted in
a recent program of the New York State Bar Association held at
Fordham Law School, empirical evidence over the past ten years has
shown the success of various mediation programs in pilot projects in
New York State, as well as in states outside of New York and
internationally. 93
1.

Federal Court Mediation Programs

By way of background, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
1998 authorized federal courts to compel parties to participate in certain
ADR processes, including mediation. 94 Although federal district courts
started designing and testing ADR procedures as early as the 1970s, the
biggest growth in ADR came in response to the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990 (CJRA), which, as amended, required the federal district courts
to develop cost and delay reduction plans including the adoption of six
case management principles, the sixth of which was alternative dispute
89 See Donna Shestowsky, When Ignorance Is Not Bliss: An Empirical Study of Litigants’
Awareness of Court-Sponsored Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, 22 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 189, 191 (2017).
90 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012) (originally enacted in 1925).
91 See 28 U.S.C. § 652 (2012).
92 See ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 23 (2d ed. 2006),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/MediCon2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EJN-WCGU].
93 See generally N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, THE LITIGATIVE DNA—THE UNDERUTILIZATION OF
MEDIATION IN NEW YORK AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2018), http://www.nysba.org/
LitigativeDnaCoursebook [https://perma.cc/3Y94-22C5].
94 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2012).
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resolution. 95 Many of the ninety-four district courts developed ADR
procedures in response to this statute. With regard to the federal courts
generally, at least twenty-five districts—or a little more than a quarter of
the courts—provide general authorization to use ADR, authorization for
settlement conferences only, or authorization for both. 96
The range of the various mediation programs—even simply among
the various districts in New York—offers experiences from which to
learn and upon which to build. Beginning in 2006, the Western District
of New York became the first federal court in New York to establish
automatic mediation programs as the initial default process to be
followed in almost all civil cases (with “opt-out provisions” 97 and
exclusions for limited matters such as habeas corpus, extraordinary
writs, bankruptcy, and social security appeals—cases that predominately
implicate issues of public policy). The pilot was initially limited to the
caseload of Judge William Skretny, who pioneered the program. The
mediation program pilot in the Western District of New York has
become a permanent part of the Court due to its success of resolving
nearly 78% of the cases without court involvement. 98 Eight years later,
the Northern District adopted a similar mandatory program with strong
settlement results as well. 99
By contrast, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York have
adopted hybrid mediation programs, with some types of cases
constituting discretionary referrals and some automatic. The Southern
District has been in the forefront, as previously mentioned, in creating
mediation pilots with accompanying discovery protocols with each new
pilot, in establishing mediator advisory panels, and in assessing
95 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471–482 (2012). The six principles that
must be included in the plan are; (1) systemic, differential treatment of complex and simple
cases; (2) early and ongoing control of the pretrial process by setting early firm trial dates,
controlling the extent of discovery and deadlines for motion practice; (3) careful and deliberate
monitoring of complex cases; (4) encouragement of cost-effective discovery and voluntary
exchange of information; (5) conservation of judicial resources by prohibiting the consideration
of discovery motions unless accompanied by certifications of good faith efforts; and (6)
authorization to refer appropriate cases to available ADR programs. § 473.
96 DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADR IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN
INITIAL REPORT 6 (2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ADR2011.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TC8Q-76K2].
97 Barry Radin, ADR Program Coordinator for the Western District of New York, stated
recently at The Litigative DNA program that motions for “opt-outs” are rarely granted. Barry
Radin, Discussion at the N.Y. State Bar Association’s Program: The Litigative DNA—The
Underutilization of Mediation in New York and What Can Be Done About It (May 9, 2018).
98 Gary Shaffer, Automatic Court Annexed Mediation in New York’s Federal District Courts:
Sometimes Numbers Don’t Lie, N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW. (N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n, New York, NY),
Spring 2018, at 2, http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=82394 [https://
perma.cc/5E7G-89CC].
99 See id. at 2–3; N.D.N.Y., GENERAL ORDER NO. 47: MANDATORY MEDIATION PROGRAM 1
(2018), www.nynd.uscourts.gov/sites/nynd/files/general-ordes/GO47.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9SVS-VLTJ]; Mandatory Mediation Program Statistics, N.D.N.Y., http://
www.nynd.uscourts.gov/mandatory-mediation-program-statistics
[https://perma.cc/WKD4EETU] (last visited Sept. 11, 2018).
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mediators on its panels. 100 The Eastern District has been in the forefront
with the ADR processes of neutral evaluation and non-binding
arbitration. What is particularly interesting about the statistics of both
the Southern and Eastern Districts is how the number of cases handled
through these programs have grown over the course of a relatively short
time period. 101 Other ADR initiatives by these District Courts have had
similar positive results. Between 2009 and today, for example, superstorm Sandy became the impetus for an insurance mediation program
both at the Eastern District and at the AAA. Over 6,000 such claims
were resolved by the AAA with a 65% settlement rate, and 69 claims
were resolved in the Eastern District with a similar settlement rate.102
Similarly, in 2009, the Southern District’s Bankruptcy Court began a
“Loss Mitigation” mediation program, which achieved loan
modifications in 56% of the matters that were mediated. 103 The success
of these mass disaster programs need not be so limited. With 98% of
civil cases eventually settling, 104 are more pilots not warranted to
address the problems identified by Judge Marrero?
2.

New York State Courts

One of the great successes with ADR and problem-solving at the
state level is to be found in the community dispute resolution programs
of the New York State Unified Court System (NYSUCS). The NYSUCS
offers parties access to free or reduced-fee mediation in family law,
general civil, and commercial law disputes, with services available in
almost all the New York State counties. 105 Any New Yorker, regardless
of whether they have a case pending in court, may use services offered
by the Community Dispute Resolution Centers (CDRCs) Program in
100 For a discussion of the evolution of the Southern District mediation program, see
generally Rebecca Price, An Alternative Approach to Justice: The Past, Present, and Future of the
Mediation Program at the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 6 Y.B. ARB.
& MEDIATION 170 (2014).
101 For example, annual reports show that in the Eastern District (which is only automatic
for FLSA cases) there was a 38% increase in discretionary referrals. See E.D.N.Y., ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION REPORT: JULY 1, 2016–JUNE 30, 2017 2 (2017), https://img.nyed.uscourts.
gov/files/local_rules/2016-2017_ADR_Annual_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XF5V-PSET].
102 Statistics from the AAA were supplied by Jeffrey Zaino, Vice President of AAA. Statistics
from the Eastern District available through the Court’s website. E.D.N.Y., ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION REPORT: JULY 1, 2015–JUNE 30, 2016 3–4 (2016), https://
img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/local_rules/2015-2016mediationreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
NVA4-9BFE].
103 See Daniel Gill, Bankruptcy Court’s Mortgage Mediation Program a Success, BANKR. ON
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.bna.com/bankruptcy-courts-mortgagen57982084348 [https://perma.cc/L2PQ-8DEU].
104 See Marrero, supra note 1, at 1659–60, 1660 n.122.
105 N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTERS PROGRAM,
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/adr/Publications/Brochures/cdrcp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/792W3JLW] (last visited Sept. 11, 2018).
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their local area. Over one thousand professionally trained mediators
volunteer their services for matters referred for arbitration and
mediation including consumer–merchant disputes, matrimonial
property division issues, and automobile Lemon Law cases. 106
As to the State’s commercial courts, a piloted program in 2014 was
established for a two-year period whereby, each week, every fifth
Commercial Division case in which a Request for Judicial Intervention
(RJI) was filed was referred to a Mandatory Mediation Pilot Project,
which for a variety of reasons was not as successful as was initially
anticipated. 107 Another pilot was begun in 2017 to cure issues
encountered in the prior pilot project. The cases in this new NonDivision Pilot Project are newly filed commercial cases (excluding pro
se matters) assigned to a justice outside the Division, and in which the
filer of the RJI designated the matter as a “Contract” case and sought a
preliminary conference. 108 In adopting this mandatory mediation pilot
project, the task force indicated that it was inspired by the positive track
records of courts that had already required parties to mediate, noting
similar programs were piloted in Florida, Texas, California, and New
Jersey. 109 The earlier pilot, which failed to meet expectations, at least
provided parameters for a new pilot, which will likely meet with better
success. Pilots have also been initiated in Surrogates Court in New York
county 110 and in Westchester county. 111 Each pilot experience provides a
guide as to how to improve ways to increase utilization of mediation in
106 “During 2016, CDRCs served 67,118 people in 27,012 total cases. . . . Family matters,
including child custody, visitation and support, accounted for 24 percent of these
cases. . . . Cases mediated through the Collaborative Family Law Center have a 91 percent
success rate[.]” N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 11–12 (2017), http://
ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/files/2018-05/16_UCS-Annual_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8S2J-BMVY].
107 See Memorandum from Chris Stern Hyman to Panel Members participating in the
March 22, 2018 Conference on Underutilization of Mediation in the Courts (Feb. 1, 2018),
http://www.nysba.org/DnaHyman [https://perma.cc/X8MS-JM9E]; CHIEF JUDGE’S TASK FORCE
ON COMMERCIAL LITIG. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 25–28 (2012), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/comdiv/
pdfs/chiefjudgestaskforceoncommerciallitigationinthe21stpdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3YHUXK25].
108 See New York County—Manhattan: ADR Overview, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://
www.nycourts.gov/courts/ComDiv/NY/ADR_overview.shtml [https://perma.cc/XL9T-KWW3]
(last updated May 24, 2018) (subsection “Mandatory Mediation Pilot Project for Certain
Commercial Cases Outside the Commercial Division”).
109 See generally John D. Feerick & Linda Gerstel, The Underutilization of Mediation in New
York and What Should Be Done About It?, 11 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW. (N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n, New
York, NY), Fall 2018, at 23–32.
110 See ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMM. OF THE N.Y. CITY BAR ASS’N, REVIEW OF THE
NEW YORK COUNTY SURROGATE’S COURT PILOT MEDIATION PROGRAM (2016), https://
s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/20073100-Surrogate_Project_Report_ALTDIS_
10.3.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/N75G-NFUT].
111 See Hon. Alan D. Scheinkman, Rules of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Program,
COM. DIVISION SUP. CT. ST. N.Y., COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER (Aug. 2011), https://www.
nycourts.gov/courts/comdiv/PDFs/9th-ADR-Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LWD-Y2CD].
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New York. As recently as April 20, 2018, Chief Judge Janet DiFiore and
Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence Marks announced a plan to
revitalize the court system’s commitment to ADR by building upon the
courts’ existing statewide programs and promoting the goals of the
Chief Judge’s Excellence Initiative to enhance the quality of justice. 112
An Advisory Committee has been formed, which is expected to consider
the expansion of ADR programs in the Supreme Court, lower civil
courts, Family Court, and Surrogates Courts, especially in the field of
mediation. 113
Infrastructure systems already in place provide quality assurance
that future expansion in court programs will be professionally handled
by educated and neutral mediators. The New York State ADR office
promotes quality assurance through the approval of mediation courses
pursuant to Part 146 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge. 114 A
comparable mediation committee exists in the Southern District and a
similar committee was recently established in the Eastern District. 115
Court rosters have grown dramatically and there are also a wealth of
mediation educational courses. 116
In my view, mediation provides for a more complete rendering of
justice in a great many situations. In the world of disputes, people seek
less trauma, less expense, less delay, greater simplicity, fewer public
embarrassments, and more options for securing a fair and just outcome.
Mediation also offers solutions not otherwise obtainable in court
litigation, as it allows for a greater consideration of the interests of the
parties. 117 Two of our greatest presidents, who expressed the values of
our founding nation, embraced ADR: Washington employed a multistep process for resolving disputes under his will, starting with an effort
to achieve an amicable outcome and ending with arbitration; 118 Lincoln,
a courtroom lawyer by profession, weighed in heavily on compromise as
a problem solving tool, noting that the nominal winner in a litigation is
often the real loser—in fees, expenses, and waste of time. 119 A century
later, United States Chief Justice Warren Burger waded in with his view
112 See Press Release, N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., New ADR Initiative Aims to Reduce Case
Delays and Enhance Access to Justice 1 (Apr. 20, 2018), http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/
files/document/files/2018-05/PR18_10.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3XQ-YVSC].
113 Id. at 2–3.
114 ADR Neutrals & Mediation Trainers / Part 146, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., http://
www.nycourts.gov/ip/adr/Part146.shtml [https://perma.cc/H944-FWUT] (last visited Sept. 11,
2018).
115 See Feerick & Gerstel, supra note 109.
116 Id.
117 See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991).
118 See THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF GEORGE WASHINGTON AND SCHEDULE OF HIS
PROPERTY, TO WHICH IS APPENDED THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF MARTHA
WASHINGTON 28 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., The Mount Vernon Ladies’ Ass’n of the Union
1939).
119 Brian D. Forrow, The Last of the General Practitioners, 59 A.B.A.J. 57, 58 (1973).
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that “[o]ur system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too
inefficient for a truly civilized people.” 120 Founder of the CPR Institute
for Dispute Resolution James F. Henry agrees: “To be equitable and just,
our civil system of resolving disputes—formal and informal—has to
offer affordable options for parties of limited means.” 121
D.

Collaborations and Education

Over the past two decades, law schools in New York and elsewhere
have demonstrated their capacity to be partners in the societal mission
of providing access to justice to all through curricular offerings in
clinical legal education and pro bono and volunteer activities of their
students, faculty, and graduates. Law students, working in clinical
programs under experienced faculty supervision and pursuant to court
rules, have provided invaluable assistance in our civil justice system to
many individuals unable to afford legal assistance. This outreach has
extended to service by students, educated and trained in the field of
mediation, as neutrals in the state courts of New York and in
community resolution centers under the auspices of the NYSUCS.
Students of many New York law schools participate in these programs,
with Fordham University School of Law as a pioneer in the Small
Claims Part of the Civil Court 122 and the Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law as a pioneer with community centers. 123 Indeed, federal courts in
New York have availed themselves of this resource in unique ways, as
exemplified by the development by former Chief Judge Loretta Preska of
a collaboration with New Jersey’s Seton Hall Law School in providing
representation to pro se parties in settlement mediations. According to
the Seton Hall director of that program, David White, over the history
of that program, 150 Seton Hall students have assisted 300 clients in
mediation advocacy with a 68% success rate. 124 Students and faculty of
other law schools as well have provided important assistance to the
federal courts in New York in dealing with civil justice matters. Further
harnessing of this resource, I suggest, could help immeasurably with the
challenges described by Judge Marrero. This might be a good subject for
a future Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for
Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, 70 A.B.A.J. 62, 66 (1984).
James F. Henry, Lawyers as Agents of Change, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 49,
50 (2001).
122 Mediation, FORDHAM U. SCH. L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/23932/mediation
[https://perma.cc/2QC8-4YVH] (last visited Sept. 11, 2018).
123 See Mediation Clinic, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCH. L., https://cardozo.yu.edu/clinicsprofessional-skills/clinics/mediation-clinic?action [https://perma.cc/Y3UF-AKUZ] (last visited
Sept. 11, 2018).
124 Email from David Michael White, Dir., Seton Hall Univ. Sch. Law Conflict Mgmt.
Program, to John Feerick, Fordham Univ. Sch. Law (Aug. 9, 2018, 05:48 EDT) (on file with
author).
120
121
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the Second Circuit.
The Bar Associations of New York are additional enormous
resources for the courts in addressing the civil justice challenges at hand.
They are mission-oriented to serve the needs of their members, and, at
the same time, they are committed to the honor and dignity of the legal
profession. These associations need to partner with the courts to address
the excesses and abuses that Judge Marrero illuminates. Indeed, the
courts require the assistance of the bar in assessing and considering the
fairness of the justice system. A useful model that might be followed
involves an initiative by the late Robert MacCrate. 125 Concerned by the
lack of collaborations between the practicing bar and the academic bar,
he created a national conference that led to an unprecedented gathering
and dialogue by bar presidents and law school deans and professors to
foster greater understanding of the respective work of the practicing and
academic communities. 126 One byproduct of this conference was
increased involvement of law professors in the work of the organized
bar and of practicing lawyers in the work of the academy.
Ethics education of students and lawyers is another remedy of
importance. The crisis of Watergate led to the creation of legal ethics as
a required course in ABA-approved law schools. 127 Part of the hope was
that such courses would help develop professional character, prompting
the late Justice Tom Clark to remark: “[o]ur law schools, it seems to me,
must shoulder the burden of ‘teaching’ honesty because there is simply
no one else to do the job.” 128 The teachers of legal ethics have done a
125 MacCrate spearheaded the MacCrate Report, the 1992 report of the ABA Task Force on
Law School and the Profession, which called for practical skills training during and after law
school.

The publication of the MacCrate Report set off a wide-ranging discussion among
academics, practitioners, bar examiners, and the judiciary in a variety of contexts
including: statewide conclaves, held in 25 states, that brought together local bar
associations, representatives of local law schools, and the judiciary, to discuss means
to improve the state’s legal educational continuum; meetings, in various law schools,
of special faculty committees and sometimes the entire faculty to discuss reforms of
the curriculum; law school conferences to discuss the Report; and numerous law
review articles discussing the Report and/or issues identified by the Report.
COMM. ON THE PROF’L EDUC. CONTINUUM, AM. BAR ASS’N, TWENTY YEARS AFTER THE
MACCRATE REPORT: A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LEGAL EDUCATION
CONTINUUM AND THE CHALLENGES FACING THE ACADEMY, BAR, AND JUDICIARY 1–2 (2013),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_
admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/june2013councilmeeting/2013_open_
session_e_report_prof_educ_continuum_committee.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/
URF6-7PXQ].
126 The conference was a February 11, 2000, ABA Conference in Dallas, Texas, called, “The
Legal Education Continuum: We Are All in this Together,” which was chaired by this author.
127 See Mark Hansen, 1965–1974: Watergate and the Rise of Legal Ethics, ABA J. (Jan. 2015),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/1965_1974_watergate_and_the_rise_of_legal_
ethics [https://perma.cc/A4M5-QJUS].
128 Hon. Tom C. Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 252–53
(1975).
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very good job of developing course materials and an active community
of educators and scholars. As noted by Professor Bruce Green, the
recipient of the 2018 ABA ethics medal, “scholars in the field look, for
example, to history and philosophy, they conduct empirical research,
and they draw on teachings of psychology, sociology, economics, and
neuroscience, among others.” 129 He cautioned that “it is unrealistic to
think that we will inoculate our students against ethical impropriety.” 130
What we can do, he said, is to help students “think deeply about what it
means to be a legal professional and what kind of professional they want
to be.” 131 Ethics courses have a unique mission, he added, including
“teaching rules, teaching students to identify and resolve ethics
problems, and inculcating professional values.” 132
The late Mary Daly, another recipient of the Michael Franck ABA
award and a role model for Professor Green, agreed with Professor
Green on the importance of including the learning from other
disciplines. By lifting the education of law students, said Daly, “it
enables us to better know who we are, and to be ourselves as best we can
be.” 133 She added: “[H]olding on to who you are and being yourself at all
times as best as you can . . . strikes me as being at the heart of
integrity.” 134 Daly said that the subject of integrity must be “exercised
within a community” and treated as an institutional and personal
virtue. 135 It involves, she said, looking beyond one’s self, beyond one’s
community, and beyond one’s institution. As to other disciplines she
said:
[O]rganizational and management theory can greatly contribute to
our understanding of how integrity is exercised in a corporate or law
firm setting. Behavioral theory can shed much light on why some
lawyers who genuinely perceive themselves as persons of integrity are
unaware of the wrongdoing around them. Cognitive science can
show how human beings are hard-wired to respond differently to
certain types of moral dilemmas. 136

129 Bruce Green, The Challenges and Rewards of Teaching Legal Ethics, J. PROF. LAW.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4) (on file with author).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. (manuscript at 5)
133 John D. Feerick, Michael Franck Professional Responsibility Award Remarks in Honor of
Mary C. Daly, Chicago, Illinois May 28, 2009, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 121, 125; see also Mary C.
Daly, Integrity in the Professional Responsibility Curriculum: A Modest Proposal for Change, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 261, 268–69, 276–77 (2003).
134 Daly, supra note 133, at 261.
135 Id. at 263.
136 Id. at 268–69.
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CONCLUSION
As modern day civil litigation, as described by Judge Marrero,
places enormous burdens on courts and judges, it diminishes the
resources available to deal with the rising tide of pro se litigants who are
entitled to the equal justice promised to all as an American ideal.
Notwithstanding the growth of volunteering by lawyers in areas of legal
services involving the poor and low-income earners, Bruce Green, in
accepting the ABA award, stated the reality that “there will never be
enough lawyers for most of the people who need them” and “self-help
materials will never adequately substitute for lawyers.” 137 He asks
whether there “isn’t [a] better strategy to change the legal system so that
it does not depend so heavily on lawyers[.] In a profession of over one
million lawyers, whose professional associations are dedicated to civil
justice reform, are there not the resources and imagination to come up
with alternatives?” 138
The bar of this country, populated with 1.4 million lawyers, active,
registered, and retired, can make a dent in some of these statistics
through increased volunteering and participation in programs of bar
associations, courts, government departments, and law schools, and in
activities of legal aid organizations and community groups. Consider
the impact if every lawyer handled one matter for those disadvantaged
and vulnerable. In addressing the problems of Big Law, to use Judge
Marrero’s words, a balance must be struck to make sure that lowincome earners and the poor are not left behind in the quest for justice.
In conclusion, if I were prescribing a required reading for anyone
journeying through my “commentaries and responses,” it would be Into
the 21st Century: Thought Pieces on Lawyering, Problem Solving, and
ADR. It was published by the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution in
2001. 139 It begins with an informative piece on ADR in history by the
late federal judge, Charles B. Renfrew and concludes with a reflective
piece by P. Elpidio Villarreal, entitled, ADR: The Stream Becomes a
Flood. All told, this sixty-nine-page book contains twenty-one essays by
practitioners, commentators, teachers, judges, and public officials. It
makes a compelling case for the adoption of ADR at all levels of the
justice system. It deserves a wide reading at this time of crisis in areas of
civil justice and of calls for major reforms in our civil justice system.

Green, supra note 129 (manuscript at 7).
Id.
139 Into the 21st Century: Thought Pieces on Lawyering, Problem Solving and ADR, 19
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1 (2001).
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